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Abstract Causal questions drive scientific enquiry. From Hume to 
Granger, and Rubin to Pearl the history of science is full of examples of 
scientists testing new theories in an effort to uncover causal mechanisms. 
The difficulty of drawing causal conclusions from observational data has 
prompted developments in new methodologies, most notably in the area 
of graphical models. We explore the relationship between existing 
theories about causal mechanisms in a social science domain, new 
mathematical and statistical modelling methods, the role of 
mathematical proof and the importance of accounting for uncertainty. 
We show that, while the mathematical sciences rely on their modelling 
assumptions, dialogue with the social sciences calls for continual 
extension of these models. We show how changing model assumptions 
lead to innovative causal structures and more nuanced casual 
explanations. We review differing techniques for determining cause in 
different disciplines using causal theories from psychology, medicine, and 
economics. 
Keywords: causality; Bradford Hill criteria; instrumental variables; causal 
algebras; graphical models; Bayesian Networks; mental models; 
uncertainty; proof. 
Introduction 
When can we say that one thing is the cause of another?  In common 
parlance, we usually intend to convey that cause is a necessary and 
sufficient precursor of an effect.  While this question motivates much of 
scientific research, causality may not be immediately amenable to the 
rigour and certainty of mathematical proof. Rather, some probabilistic, 
interventionist notion of causality is required to model the observations 
and uncertainty in the system. 
In the search for truth and evidence, typically, we want to understand the 
real world and so we build a model that captures the entities, stimuli, 
relationships, and behaviours we observe (French, 2015). This can be a 
simulation or a mathematical model that describes the observed elements 
of interest. However, uncertainties arise because the model can only ever 
be an approximate representation of the world. There may be uncertainty 
about scientific theory, the strength of the effect, randomness, unknown 
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future values, and calculation accuracy.  Additionally, all models 
incorporate subjective uncertainties, degrees of belief and preferences 
automatically built in by the choices and assumptions of the modellers. 
This leads to uncertainty about the descriptive model’s ability to capture 
all the salient features of the world, uncertainty pertaining to the beliefs 
and values encoded within the model and uncertainty about how many 
analyses to perform to be sure of the model. 
The lack of uncertainty in mathematical proofs, and their enduring nature 
is what attracts some to the field (Barons and Chleboun, 2015). 
Woodward, in his account of interventionist causation states that, 
‘genuinely explanatory proofs are those that show us how the truth of 
some theorem depends on the assumptions from which the theorem is 
proved.’ Thus, ‘when a theory tells us how Y would change under 
interventions on X, we have (or have material for constructing) a causal 
explanation’ (Woodward, 2003). Proofs that are truly explanatory 
characterise a property about a structure in a theorem such that it is 
evident that the result depends on the property. Proofs of this nature 
allow us to see how the effect changes in response. Essentially, proofs are 
an immutable tool to aid research in its search for causal relationships.  
We begin with a history of causal understanding then describe current 
tools for causal analysis, and move on to recent developments in causal 
analysis and how the dialogue between mathematical, medical and social 
sciences are pushing the boundaries of knowledge. 
A brief, interdisciplinary history of causation 
The tension between existing coherent causal theories (understanding of 
biological mechanism, domain expertise, etc.) and the results of models, 
built from observational data has a rich history. Understanding the nature 
of the current dialogue between theory and practice requires knowledge 
of the history of causal understanding as well as the state of existing 
methodologies. This knowledge base prompts discussion about pivotal 
new modelling techniques that allow for more nuanced representations of 
causal mechanisms. 
The complexities of statistical models may sometimes obscure what 
scientists actually mean by cause. Helpfully, Cox and Wermuth identify 
three broad types of causality (Cox and Wermuth, 1996): 
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A. Causality as a statistical dependence which cannot be removed by 
alternative acceptable explanatory variables 
B. Causality as inferred consequence of some intervention in the system  
C. Causality as inferred consequence of some intervention in the system 
augmented by some understanding of a process or mechanism accounting 
for what is observed.  
Questions of life and death prompted the earliest causal investigations. 
Several disciplines point to John Snow as one of the first scientists to frame 
causal questions systematically. John Snow was a medical doctor with an 
aptitude for mathematics. In the 1830s, Snow worked to understand what 
caused a devastating outbreak of cholera (Snow, 1855). At the time, the 
causal mechanism for cholera was unknown and Snow was sceptical about 
the prevailing miasma theory. After plotting on a map the number of 
outbreaks on each street and examining the counts, Snow noticed that the 
deaths clustered around the Broad Street water pump.  However, no one 
working at the nearby brewery was getting ill. Further enquiry revealed 
that brewery workers drank beer during the lunch hour and not water 
from the Broad Street pump. His findings helped to prove that water 
contamination was a cause of cholera, drawing a causal conclusion from 
observational data. This is type B causality in the Cox and Wermuth 
framework. 
Around the same time, Semmelweis investigated deaths in a hospital 
where he observed a decline in childbed fevers when doctors washed their 
hands with chlorinated lime after working on cadavers and before 
attending the maternity unit. His careful charting looks convincing today, 
but without the relevant germ theory developed and proved a few 
decades later through experimentation by scientists like Pasteur and Koch, 
Semmelweis’s findings failed to find an audience. This unfortunate failure 
to communicate convincingly an unexpected causal link, type B causality 
in the Cox and Wermuth framework, underlines the fact that researchers 
expect to find explanations that cohere with their existing causal theories. 
The opposition Semmelweis met with after uncovering a new biological 
mechanism highlights just how difficult causal questions are to answer, 
particularly when the only information at our disposal is observational. 
A few years later, economist George Yule began asking causal questions as 
he investigated the relationship between the changes in poverty rate with 
the proportion of public benefits (Yule, 1895). Controlling for confounders 
and multiple variables (Type A causality) proved pivotal to a multiple linear 
regression model, laying the foundation for much of the regression tools 
that proliferated among economists.  
Exchanges: The Interdisciplinary Research Journal 
 
75 Barons & Wilkerson. Exchanges 2018 5(2), pp. 72-89 
 
Phillip Wright sought to investigate the relationship between tax policy 
and demand and supply elasticity (Wright, 1928). His work on this subject 
introduced the concept of instrumental variables (IVs). In cases where a 
correlation exists between the explanatory variable of interest and the 
error term in the model, a variable that is correlated with the explanatory 
variable of interest, but independent the error term or outcome, may be 
added to the model. Then, by holding one variable constant and varying 
another, how the other changes can be used to infer relationships. For 
example, tobacco tax affects tobacco use but not health making it a 
candidate IV to investigate the causal link between smoking and health. 
Instrumental variables, another example of type A causality, have been a 
formative tool for addressing questions of causation in economics. Later 
developments in statistical theory would further augment the importance 
of IVs. 
As causal questions gathered momentum in the medical, social, and 
mathematical sciences, psychologists questioned how humans 
understand cause. Kenneth Craik, pioneer of mental models, maintained 
that, ‘If the organism carries a ‘small-scale model’ of external reality and 
of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various 
alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations 
before they arise, utilize the knowledge of past events in dealing with the 
present and the future, and in every way react in a much fuller, safer, and 
more competent manner to the emergencies which face it’ (Craik, 1944). 
People construct internal models to represent the causal texture of the 
environment (Tolman and Brunswik, 1935). Understanding the nature of 
how humans comprehend cause is crucial to avoiding fallacies in the 
development of causal models and introducing error and uncertainty.  
A critical advancement in causal thinking occurred in 1965, when 
epidemiologist Sir Austin Bradford Hill proposed a set of criteria for 
determining causal relationships from observational studies. Working 
together with physician Richard Doll, they had uncovered the causal link 
between smoking and lung cancer from observational data. Since a 
randomised controlled trial would be both unethical and infeasible, 
Bradford Hill and Doll instead had interviewed lung cancer patients about 
their smoking habits and exposure to other postulated causes (exposure 
to car fumes, tarmac dust and coal fire dust). In one of the earliest case-
control studies, they matched the lung cancer patients to patients with 
carcinomas of the stomach or colon by age, sex, social class, and place of 
residence. The risk of developing lung cancer proved to be 50 times greater 
among patients who smoked 25 or more cigarettes a day when compared 
with non-smokers. This established a strong correlation, but in order to 
definitively establish the causal link, they undertook a prospective study 
of over 24,000 smokers and non-smokers among male medical 
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professionals aged over 35 (who smoked at the same rates as other 
occupations at the time).  The causal link (type A and C causality) was 
demonstrated by a clear dose-response among smokers and a clear 
difference in rates of lung cancer between smokers and non-smokers. 
Causality was accepted when they published these preliminary findings 
three years later (Doll and Bradford Hill, 1950).  
From these observational studies, Bradford Hill went on to establish a set 
of criteria for determining cause from observational data. The criteria 
require that a causal effect should demonstrate:  
• Strength, a large effect size  
• Consistency (reproducibility)  
• Specificity to a particular population, site, disease  
• Temporality, cause happens before effects,  
• Appropriate biological gradient, dose response  
• Plausible mechanism between cause and effect  
• Coherence, agreement between observations and laboratory results 
• Experimental evidence, where practicable 
• Analogy, similarity to the effect of similar factors.  
Since their development in 1965, the criteria have provided a hallmarks of 
causal links for medicine, epidemiology, and public health. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the next important advance was the 
development of new types of graphical models, probabilistic models in 
which a graph expresses a conditional dependence structure between 
variables, and probability captures uncertainty by using appropriate 
distributions of values rather than point estimates. These uncover type A 
and C causality. Clive Granger proposed econometric time series models 
that defined a Granger cause (Granger, 1988) when the cause occurs prior 
to the effect and the cause has unique information about the future values 
of its effect. Rubin developed a potential outcomes framework, posing 
counterfactual questions about what would have been observed had 
different conditions prevailed. Judea Pearl and other statisticians and 
computer scientists explored the rich space of probabilistic graphical 
models that have been successfully applied to a vast array of applications, 
specifically Bayesian networks (BNs, see Figs. 1 and 2). Graphical models 
have now become ubiquitous and are typically one of the first tools used 
to address causal questions.  
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As network data becomes more readily available in the medical and social 
sciences, enabling the use of probabilistic graphical models, the debate 
about the importance of theory versus methodology is more pressing than 
ever. We will review these methods below before posing interdisciplinary 
questions at the boundary of current causal theory and methodology in 
the subsequent section. 
Current tools of causal analysis  
Current practices for determining causation vary across disciplines, in line 
with the history of each discipline. Randomised control trials remain the 
gold standard, especially in medicine, but where this is infeasible, 
scientists turn to discipline-specific tools to analyse observational data. 
Medical scientists tend to place particular importance on existing theories 
about causal pathways, in preference to allowing causal discovery 
algorithms to guide their experiment design. Since it is usually infeasible 
to measure every possible variable, current understanding about plausible 
causal explanations tend to drive experimental design. 
Bradford Hill criteria for study design 
Epidemiology uses the Bradford Hill criteria to synthesise results from 
observational studies. For example, the Bradford Hill criteria have been 
used to make the case that sleep deprivation is a cause of obesity and of 
several chronic diseases, each criterion satisfied by different study designs 
(Cappuccio et al., 2010). In the USA, as the average number of hours adults 
reported sleeping declined from 9.0 in 1910 to 6.8 in 2005, average BMI in 
the same population rose from 23.0 in 1910 to 26.9 in 2005, suggesting an 
association.  A cross-sectional meta-analysis (Cappuccio et al., 2008) 
showed an association between short duration of sleep and obesity 
prevalence (the proportion of cases in the population at a time point) in 
both children and adults, demonstrating the strength, specificity and 
consistency of association. A prospective study to see if exposure precedes 
outcome then determines the directionality. Recent work measured 
obesity incidence and showed that both children and adults with short 
sleep had an increased risk of developing obesity over time with the same 
order of magnitude. Carefully designed, short term randomised controlled 
trials of short and disturbed sleep determined a dose-response in key 
hormonal changes which replicated across people and reversed when 
sleep returned to normal.  Observed changes in the levels of two 
hormones, leptin and ghrelin, which regulate appetite provide a plausible 
biological mechanisms for sleep deprivation causing obesity. Analogous 
results found plausible mechanisms for sleep deprivation causing 
diabetes, hypertension and coronary heart disease. (Spiegel et al., 2009, 
Broussard et al., 2012; Cappuccio et al., 2011; Leng et al., 2015). 
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In all of these studies, the effects are strong (large relative risks), 
consistent, show a temporal sequence, a dose – response, have biological 
plausibility and reversibility in controlled trial conditions (at least short-
term), so under the Bradford Hill criteria we accept that poor sleep causes 
obesity and causes these chronic diseases. These criteria continue to guide 
study design in epidemiological research today. Understanding how these 
criteria are implemented is crucial for appropriate extra-disciplinary 
applications of statistical methods. This represents an area of growth for 
interdisciplinary work between statisticians and epidemiologists.  
Causation as invariant statistical dependence in graphical 
models 
Whilst the medical sciences are focused on uncovering the biological 
mechanism responsible for cause in a system in order to provide 
appropriate interventions, the mathematical sciences offer a powerful 
alternative to the traditional way of addressing this problem. Probabilistic 
graphical models offer a tremendous opportunity to inform experimental 
design alongside the qualitative considerations outlined above.  
To address the questions of statistical dependence and consequences of 
interventions, scientists across disciplinary boundaries often use graphical 
models. Partially inspired by Wright’s work on path diagrams (Wright, 
1934), researchers began to use graphical models to depict the 
relationships between elements of a system. One of the most pervasive 
types of graphical model is the Bayesian network. These structures model 
problems as sets of nodes and directed edges without cycles.  For instance, 
our system might be represented by the Bayesian network in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: A sample Bayesian network. In this graph, X, Y and Z are random 
variables and the directed edges (arrows) represent the dependencies between 
the variables.  This is a directed acyclic graph (DAG), since it is not possible to 
return to any node by following the directed edges. Formally, a BN is a directed 
acyclic graph and a set of independence statements. 
Whilst it is tempting to interpret the arrows here as strictly causal, the 
mathematical interpretation of this graph is rather less strong. Under the 
critical Markov assumptions, it tells us that X and Z are independent given 
Y (Markov, 1954). Missing edges in graphs (such as that between X and Z) 
demonstrate independences in the graph—our starting point for 
determining what doesn’t cause what in a graph. In fact, each graph 
belongs to a class of equivalent graphs that encode the same conditional 
independence relationships.  
Exchanges: The Interdisciplinary Research Journal 
 
79 Barons & Wilkerson. Exchanges 2018 5(2), pp. 72-89 
 
In our example, the Bayesian networks in Figure 2 are all equivalent 
because they all represent X and Z as conditionally independent. Bayesian 
networks also fulfil the Faithfulness Assumption, which means that all of 
the necessary conditional independence statements are encoded by the 
network. That is, there are no additional, context-specific independences 




Figure 2: Equivalent Bayesian 
networks, all encoding that X is 




To determine what Pearl terms ‘genuine cause’ our model must admit an 
instrumental variable (Figure 3) to identify which causes are invariant 
across the class of equivalent graphs. A Bayesian network is truly causal 
when each of the nodes is invariant to marginalisation. That is, forcing a 
variable node to take a particular value has the same effect on the other 
nodes as if the variable had taken that value naturally. 
 
Figure 3: Bayesian network encoding that Z is independent of both X and U, given 
Y.  Z is an instrumental variable. i) Z is associated with the treatment X. ii) Z is 
independent of the unobserved confounding factors affecting our treatment and 
outcome (X and Y, respectively). iii) Z is independent of Y given X and the 
unobserved confounders. 
Using these fundamental assumptions, Bayesian networks that are 
invariant to marginalisation can be used to determine mathematically 
causal relationships within a system. These networks can then be used to 
estimate the effect of proposed interventions using Pearl’s Do-Calculus 
(Pearl, 2009), and so can form the basis of policy decision support.  
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The promise of Bayesian networks has catalysed research into algorithms 
to find network structure from data and causal relationships within a 
network (Entner, 2013). Causal discovery algorithms have expedited the 
disciplinary reach of these methods, and as more and more data becomes 
available, the social sciences are beginning to leverage these methods.  
However, their usefulness is limited unless used alongside domain 
expertise and qualitative considerations, such as that used in the Bradford 
Hill criteria. 
Recent advancement in causal analysis  
The collaboration between quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
causation represents a key area for research growth, providing methods 
to combine data, expert knowledge and plausible assumptions to reach 
causal conclusions. Mathematicians are working to refine the assumptions 
of graphical models, remedy limitations of scope in existing methodology 
and define new classes of models that may be better suited to specific 
causal questions raised in an array of disciplines.  
Refining model assumptions 
When using observational data the question arises how we can compute 
the causal effect of one variable on another from data obtained from 
passive observation without interventions? By using a graph to represent 
the problem, this becomes a graph-theoretic problem. Pearl (2016) 
introduced a back-door criterion, identifying which variables should be 
conditioned on when investigating a causal relationship between other 
variables. 
Bayesian networks can legitimately be used as long as the model meets 
the Markov and faithfulness assumptions. The faithfulness assumption 
strengthens the inferences we can draw in some practical applications 
(e.g. Chen et al., 2007).  A live area of research seeks to relax these and 
other assumptions in robust ways to obtain more flexible notions of causal 
inference.  
One recent example of a method for relaxing the faithfulness assumption 
for when treatment and outcome are confounded is the witness 
protection program protocol developed by Silva and Evans (2016). This 
provides ways to find a set of variables that allow a witness variable to be 
used as an instrumental variable to give bounds on the average causal 
effect. This also allows us to differentiate between strong directed effects 
and strong active paths and thus more nuanced definitions of causation. 
In this way, the new witness variable bridges back-door adjustment and 
the IV adjustment via the faithfulness assumption. 
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The importance of assumptions in mathematical and modelling cannot be 
overstated: the real purpose of causal discovery methods is not to provide 
neat answers, but rather to demonstrate that observational data is 
compatible with more tentative answers. For this it may be necessary to 
devise new models 
Defining new models: the chain graph 
The complex, rich and diverse tasks of the statistician include 
understanding research questions in other fields, designing empirical 
studies, evaluating models and methods of analysis, and interpreting 
evidence in data and results of statistical analyses. Understanding a 
problem statistically requires thorough investigation of the context, 
response variables of interest, regressors, and intermediate or mediating 
variables.  
However, naïve or inappropriate use of statistical methodology can lead 
to indefensible conclusions and studies which fail to replicate the same 
results with appropriate alternate data sets.  Failure to replicate a studied 
effect calls into question the hypothesised causal relationships. From a 
statistical perspective, some methods may not permit replication. 
Consequently, some measures of dependence are inappropriate if 
replication under stated conditions is a purpose of the research, such as in 
medical applications. For example, applying multivariate methods to 
several binary variables will not give replication when the context 
conditions of studies differ strongly. To address this, Wermuth and 
Marchetti (2017) demonstrate that replicable results are permitted by 
well-fitting, mean zero Ising models (Ising, 1925). 
Another difficulty is that, in a given study, joint responses may be needed 
to properly capture effects of interventions. For instance, a medication to 
treat high blood pressure affects both systolic and diastolic blood pressure 
simultaneously, so it is not appropriate to model them as occurring 
sequentially. Hence, models should include joint responses whenever no 
order is plausible for several responses which remain related after their 
regressions on important explanatory variables. 
To circumvent the limitations of the DAG models (Figure 1) to capture joint 
responses, Wermuth and Cox (2013) suggest regression graphs, a chain 
graph structure that encodes the ordering of joint responses by blocking 
together variables of the same type (response, intermediate, explanatory, 
background) and that represent conditional independences between 
them. These graphs are particularly adept at representing joint responses, 
(Cox and Wermuth, 1993; Drton, 2009; Fallat et al., 2017).  
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Interdisciplinary efforts towards careful definition of the problem context, 
possible regressors, and joint responses motivates advancements in 
probabilistic graphical models. 
Defining new classes of models as series of events 
While the Bayesian network is a powerful tool for causal models, it is not 
always appropriate. Often, causal claims may be presented as a narrative 
of sequential events which can be described mathematically by an event 
tree. These can be transformed to a new class of graphical model, the 
chain event graph (CEG) which admits a unique causal algebra. Using 
algebraic statistics, we can extend the machinery of Bayesian networks to 
other classes of graphical mode in the following way.  
In an undirected graph, the directionality of the relationships between 
variables represented by an undirected edge is ambiguous, so no causal 
structure can be inferred. In a directed graph, such as a Bayesian network 
(BN), we have potential causal relationships given by the set of possible 
collections of conditional independence statements that describe the 
data. Causal discovery algorithms score possible BNs according to how well 
they fit the data. Often, these discovered graphs are then reverse-
engineered to infer causal implications and estimate causal effects, 
assuming graph is the truth. Although the output of the causal discovery 
algorithms is often taken to be causal, Spirtes and Pearl argue that such 
output alone is not sufficient to deduce a cause (Spirtes, 2000; Pearl, 2009) 
since there is an entire class of statistically equivalent graphs which can be 
represented by the same essential graph, having only the directed edges 
common to all graphs in the class.  These are all candidates for truly causal 
relationships. Pearl further defines a genuine cause in a graph as a random 
variable that has an associated instrumental parent within its essential 
graph.  
This idea can be expanded beyond BNs to other classes of graphical 
models. In particular, we now have a suite of tools that allow us to fully 
explore chain event graphs (CEGs). Cowell and Smith (2014) develop causal 
discovery techniques to find the best fitting CEG from data. Thwaites et al. 
(2010) demonstrated how the causal hypotheses of a CEG offer a profound 
flexibility. These classes have been extended even further using computer 
algebras (Görgen, 2017). Görgen and Smith (2017) define the statistical 
equivalence classes of staged trees, identifying the set of possible 
representations. Potential causal directionality on variables deduced from 
quaternion relationships can be found from algebraic features shared by 
all elements in an equivalence class. This is analogous to essential graphs. 
As shown by Collazo et al. (2018), this new class of graphs accommodates 
a much richer space of causal hypotheses. 
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Impact on the social sciences 
Joint responses, asymmetric and sequential relationships seen in the 
medical and social sciences have driven the development of new 
mathematical models to explore them. Mathematical models are also 
used to explore mental models. 
For psychologists, one open question regarding causation is how do 
people update their mental models of cognition? Causal judgements help 
us learn to predict and control our world, build causal models, to reason 
about evidence, and to determine how we attribute responsibilities to 
ourselves or others, especially with respect to legal or medical evidence. 
Causal judgements also affect our temporal beliefs; it has been shown that 
these mental models can even override our perception of the order in 
which things happen (Bechlivanidis and Lagnado, 2016). When learning 
about a system, we may choose interventions to target local uncertainty 
in a model (Bramley et al., 2015; 2017).  The metaphor of Neurath’s ship 
describes how experience is believed to update mental causal models. ‘We 
are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are 
never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away 
a new one must at once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is 
used as support. In this way … the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but 
only by gradual reconstruction’ (Quine, 1960).  In the absence of knowing 
all possible models, a current mental model shifts slowly in the light of 
evidence, adapting with local changes.  
Current studies are underway to investigate how people learn graphical 
models. While the development and proliferation of Bayesian network 
methods proved a useful tool for psychologists to articulate new models 
of cognition, their work in turn has profound insight for how statisticians 
communicate their results to convey understanding to non-specialists. 
This is particularly important when probabilistic graphical models are used 
to underpin decision support mechanisms designed to evaluate alternate 
courses of action (Smith, 2010; Smith et al., 2015; Barons et al., 2018). 
Economists and medical researchers share a common interest in 
determining the role and importance of theory in these new causal 
experiments. Some economists (Deaton and Cartwright, 2016; 
Heckerman et al., 1995) advocate that there can be no causation without 
theory. This ties in to the Bradford Hill criterion—that we expect any 
potentially valid causal explanation not to contradict known theories. 
Medical professionals are concerned about the increasing reach of causal 
discovery algorithms to suggest new biological mechanism.  For example, 
in Hill et al. (2012), dynamic Bayesian networks were used to infer the 
protein signalling network structure in a breast cancer cell line. This 
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generated testable hypotheses, which were then independently validated 
using targeted inhibition, improving knowledge about breast cancer. 
The debate about the importance of theory is a rich opportunity for 
computational scientists to develop models more attune to relevant 
theories. Discovering reproducible, robust causal results demands working 
alongside other disciplines to further the symbiotic relationship between 
the mathematical and social sciences. 
Discussion 
Causal theory and techniques to determine causation from observational 
data have an uneasy alliance. The mathematical sciences have produced 
powerful statistical models and machine learning techniques that have 
rendered causal discovery techniques accessible to a new range of social 
sciences. Economists and psychologists are using these new methods to 
ask more in-depth questions about drivers in economics and cognition. 
Causal discovery techniques discover plausible biological mechanisms with 
increasing rapidity.   
Mathematical methods are inevitably subject to the underlying 
mathematical assumptions on which their foundational proofs rely. 
Ideally, causal analysis across disciplines works in tandem, with model 
results guiding further discovery in the medical or social sciences. In turn, 
practitioners in medical and social sciences may expose the limitation of 
current methodology, which in turn prompts mathematical developments 
to create bespoke models. The tension between existing theories about 
causal mechanisms can be a productive conversation rife with new 
research opportunities. 
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